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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On October 26, 2012, the University of Akron School of Law’s 
Center for Intellectual Property and Technology hosted its Sixth Annual IP 
Scholars Forum.  In attendance were thirteen legal scholars with expertise 
and an interest in IP and public health who met to discuss problems and 
potential solutions at the intersection of these fields.  This report 
summarizes this discussion by describing the problems raised, areas of 
agreement and disagreement between the participants, suggestions and 
solutions made by participants and the subsequent evaluations of these 
suggestions and solutions. 
Led by the moderator, participants at the Forum focused generally 
on three broad questions.  First, are there alternatives to either the patent 
system or specific patent doctrines that can provide or help provide 
sufficient incentives for health-related innovation?  Second, is health 
information being used proprietarily and if so, is this type of protection 
appropriate?  Third, does IP conflict with other non-IP values that are 
important in health and how does or can IP law help resolve these conflicts?  
This report addresses each of these questions in turn. 
 
II.  THE PATENT SYSTEM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
 The IP Forum began by noting that although there are numerous 
problems with the patent system, such as high costs for prosecution1 and 
litigation,2 uncertainty as to patent validity,3 and using nebulous terms and 
concepts like non-obviousness, utility, and novelty,4 many consider patent 
law the primary driver of health-related innovation in the United States.5  In 
fact, some have argued that patents are the best way to incentivize 
1 Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 
17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 167-68 (2010). 
2 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy From Empirical Research 
on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). 
3 Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1737, 1740-42 (2011). 
4 Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
39, 40-41 (2008). 
5 Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 43, 93 (2012) (stating that “patent law shapes biomedical innovation,” but 
noting that federal research funding also plays a role); see also Andrew W. Torrance, 
Nothing Under the Sun that is Made of Man 31 (2012) (on file with Reporter) 
(“Biotechnology owes much of its rapid progress to the availability of patent protection for 
genes and their polypeptide products.”). 
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innovation and that the U.S. patent system is the best in the world.6  The 
underlying rationale is an oft-told story.  We have a free market economy 
which ultimately lets consumers decide, ex post, which innovations were 
worthy investments of research and development.7  This may be superior to 
a grant system which, ex ante, puts the valuation decision in the hands of 
the government or other institutions and could squander limited resources 
on ineffective, inefficient, or impractical innovations.8  In short, the market 
can, and should, provide the incentives for innovation.  
 The discussion began by questioning this traditional premise.  Is it 
true that markets are the best way to incentivize health-related innovation?  
Are there alternatives to the patent system that would work better?  Or are 
there ways to improve the patent system so it works better?9 
 
A.  Incentivizing What? 
 An important and foundational issue to discerning how the patent 
system can be improved or what alternatives would be better is to 
understand what goals the patent system should seek to achieve and whether 
it actually achieves them.  Apropos of the Forum’s focus on health care, 
these same questions can be asked with respect to the role of patents driving 
innovation in health care.  The strong reasons for market failure in health 
care innovation make it particularly difficult. 
For hundreds of years we have thought that the patent system is the 
best system for innovation, but we really have no idea whatsoever.  
Reference was made to a National Academy of Sciences study, which 
concluded that “we need a much more detailed understanding of how the 
6 See U.S. v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 335 n.12 (citing National Patent Planning 
Commission, The American Patent System, 25 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 456, 457 (1943) (“The 
strongest industrial nations have the most effective patent systems, and after a careful 
study, the Commission has reached the conclusion that the American system is the best in 
the world.”)). 
7 Jane M. Marciniszyn, What Has Happened Since Chakrabarty?, 2 J.L. & HEALTH 141, 
141-42 (1988) (quoting Arthur R. Whale, 7 APLA Q.J. 172 (1979)); see also SUZANNE 
SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION & INCENTIVES 58 (“As an incentive mechanism, intellectual 
property has the following virtues: 1. The reward is linked to the social value of the 
invention, so that firms will, to some degree, compare social value and social cost when 
deciding whether to invest. 2. Users of the intellectual property voluntarily pay the costs, so 
no one objects to its development.”). 
8 See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 194-95 
(2003). 
9 One such proposal for reforming patent law is Thomas C. Folsom, Algorithm Methods 
and Their Biological Issue (2012) (on file with Reporter). 
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patent system affects innovation in various sectors.”10  For example, patents 
could work wonderfully to incentivize innovation in the biotechnology 
sector, but could stifle innovation in the computer hardware sector.  Other 
studies suggest that our patent system may not be incentivizing innovation 
at an optimal rate.11  It could be that the patent system is the best system for 
promoting innovation.  Perhaps it is not.  But if we are going to rely on the 
patent system for so much, such as providing excellent innovations in health 
care, then we really should have a better idea rather than simply assuming 
this is the case.  As mentioned earlier, the reasons for market failure make 
health care an especially difficult case. 
 But perhaps a more fundamental issue is thinking about what 
patents, or any other systems, are supposed to incentivize.  Are they 
supposed to incentivize invention, development (i.e. delivering inventions 
in tangible ways), or both?  If both, to what extent?  Although both 
invention and development relate to innovation, they are two distinct parts 
of the process.  For example, it was noted that medical technologies often 
come out of research universities based on subsidies.  It is after patents are 
applied for or obtained that these technologies are developed by 
pharmaceutical and medical device companies.  This illustrates the 
importance of patents on the development side rather than the invention 
side.  Yet, without the proper focus on invention and development, this may 
lead to less than optimal results.  For example, having a lot of inventions 
that are never developed would be undesirable.  Likewise, fully developing 
the only existing invention would be undesirable.  It seems that the system 
we endorse should try to drive both invention and development.12 
 
B.  Overbroad and Overcomplex? 
 A potential problem with relying on the patent system to incentivize 
health-related innovation is the overbreadth and overcomplexity of the 
patent system.  Jim Chen suggested that the problem with the Patent Act 
was its Swiss army knife characteristic – it tries to accomplish everything 
by having been written with broad applicability and not being technology-
specific.  The Patent Act serves as an open charter for innovation much like 
10 National Research Council of the National Academies, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 2 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).  
11 See e.g. Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 
10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 167 (2009). 
12 See Jay Dratler, Jr., Invention is a Process, or Why the Electronics and Pharmaceutical 
Industries are at Loggerheads over Patents, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899924 (2006). 
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the Sherman Act does for free enterprise and competition.13  The Patent Act 
can be considered overbroad at the formal statutory level because it is 
written as if it were a constitution.14  In fact, the core of the Patent Act is a 
few sections with short phrases replete with excessive generalities.15  It is 
unlike the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which is a classic regulatory 
statute with amazing specificity.16   
Some participants argued that overcomplexity results because of this 
broad, constitution-like language.  Congress has, by using broad language, 
delegated innovation policy to the courts to develop common law-esque 
doctrines under the language of sections 101, 102, 103, and 112 of the 
Patent Act.17  Because of this delegation, the courts have created an 
extraordinarily complex system that appears to be ad hoc and devoid of any 
meaningful structure tied to the validity of science or its application to 
solving human problems.18 
For several participants, one of the major flaws of the patent system 
is it is too general and does not focus on separate technologies or industries.  
TRIPS now requires this uniform approach to patent law.19  But not all 
participants agreed this was problematic.  There was a fairly even split on 
whether the Patent Act’s one-size-fits-all approach was a good idea.  Some 
detractors of TRIPS’s uniformity principle viewed varied patent terms, 
13 Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 
(2010) (patent stakeholders should keep in mind that the patent code, much like the 
Sherman Act, is a common law enabling statute, leaving ample room for courts to fill in the 
interstices or to create doctrine emanating solely from Article III's province.).  
14 One explanation for this is that the first patent act, which serves as the basis for the 
current patent act, was written nearly contemporaneously with the U.S. Constitution. 
15 See e.g. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (listing patentable subject matter as covering processes, 
machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof ) and 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject  matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be 
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.”).  
16 See 21 U.S.C. § 301, et seq. (2012). 
17 Obviousness, inherent anticipation, and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
are all examples of vague, but key, concepts that courts have been forced to develop as  a 
result of Congress’s use of broad language in the Patent Act. 
18 See Jay Dratler, Jr., Fixing Our Broken Patent System, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
47, 66 n.60 (2010). 
19 TRIPS art. 27(1) (“Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.  Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 
3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are 
imported or locally produced.”) (emphasis added). 
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stronger patentability requirements, and the need for actual reduction to 
practice as positive developments for invention and development. 
 To justify the TRIPS approach to a broad, non-discriminatory patent 
system, participants pointed out that when the U.S. patent system was first 
created, the U.S. was a least-developed country and our hope for our patent 
system was from that perspective.  We used this system to move from 
newly released colony to world power.  Perhaps this same approach can be 
useful to other developing nations and will permit them to rapidly innovate 
like the U.S. has done. 
With respect to the Patent Act bearing resemblance to a constitution, 
participants pointed out that that this broad language has served as an 
umbrella to more than one patent system.  That is, our patent system has 
changed based on how the courts have interpreted the broad standards set 
out in the Patent Act.  And it is for this reason that we cannot answer the 
question of whether the patent system works; it is always changing due to 
changed circumstances.  We have ratcheted up and down the standards for 
obviousness, patentable subject matter, utility, etcetera and the one-size-fits-
all approach has allowed this to happen.20   
Although the courts have traditionally undertaken this ratcheting 
role, we should also ask what other institutions should play a role in shaping 
innovation policy.  Sometimes courts do this in a way that includes other 
institutions, such as the PTO, industry stakeholders, and the general 
public,21 but not always.  Perhaps the PTO should be more involved in the 
process of establishing policy to incentivize innovation.22  Given its 
frequent interactions with innovators, the PTO may be well-situated to help 
determine if the rules we have established for promoting innovation actually 
reflect how innovation takes place.  Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, 
we may need some other administrative agency or non-governmental 
organization to give its input on innovation policy.  Whatever form it takes, 
it could be helpful in developing a focused and particularized patent system 
or an effective, broad system, but at least it would be a more informed 
system.23 
Despite some participants’ pushes for a more technology-specific 
approach to patent law, others were resistant.  A comparison was made 
20 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 
(2003). 
21 See generally Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit 
En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733 (2011). 
22 See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for 
the PTO, 54 WM & MARY L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2166560.  
23 If it turns out that a particularized, technology-specific system is optimal, then TRIPS 
art. 27 very much hamstrings out abilities to use patent rights most effectively. 
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between this approach to patent law and copyright law.  In contrast to the 
Patent Act, the Copyright Act has incredibly detailed provisions.24  It was 
suggested that before adopting a detailed approach to patent law, we must 
ask ourselves if the current patent system is worse than the copyright 
system.  To some, it is not clear that it is. 
 
C.  Alternatives to the Patent System 
 Participants discussed many alternatives to the patent system.  The 
list of possibilities that could incentivize innovation included Regulatory 
Competitive Shelters (RCSs),25 such as the exclusive marketing periods for 
certain generic drugs, biologicals, and other innovations provided under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and similar statutes;26 prizes;27 government subsidies 
and education;28 other types of IP, such as copyright protection;29 and open 
user and collaborative innovation systems.30  RCSs and collectively 
governed systems received the most attention and are discussed in detail 
below. 
 Despite the variety of alternatives to patents, participants noted that 
the success of these alternatives depends on the industry and technology.  
One system may work very well for the medical industry, but not so well 
for the software industry.  Even within a particular industry, optimal 
systems may vary.  For example, within the medical industry, one 
alternative might work very well for pharmaceuticals, but not great for 
medical devices.  This analysis can become fractured very quickly when 
discussing whether and to what extent these alternatives work.  Perhaps an 
alternative works well for diabetes drugs, but not very well for cancer 
drugs. 
 Another suggested alternative to incentivizing innovation was not 
really an alternative system, but a rejection of all systems.  Taken from Matt 
Ridley’s work, one participant posited that innovation simply happens 
24 See e.g. 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(5), 111, 112, 114, 115 (2012). 
25 See infra Part II.C.1. 
26 See generally Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters – An Emerging Class of 
Administrative Properties (forthcoming 2013).  
27 See e.g. The X Prize, http://www.xprize.org; see also Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van 
Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 525-26 
(2001). 
28 See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S96 
(1990). 
29 See e.g. Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); Dan L. 
Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 469 (1988-89). 
30 See infra Part II.C.2; see generally Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community 
Norms: At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2237 (2009). 
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regardless of what we do to incentivize it.31  That is, innovation happens at 
an increasing trend because there are more and more ideas and more and 
more people to combine ideas and it may not matter if we have patents, 
copyrights, prizes, regulations, or anything else for that matter.32  
Innovation occurs whether we want it or not.  This was a comforting 
thought to some who were convinced that it is impossible to design a 
system where moneyed-interests are not trying to get the best advantage and 
where the behemoths that developed the initial technology have driven 
innovators to work within that ecosystem rather than develop an entirely 
new one.33 
 
1.  Regulatory Competitive Shelters 
One solution proposed by Yaniv Heled was the further use of 
Regulatory Competitive Shelters (RCSs), which are specifically crafted 
shelters from competition afforded by the government to give competitive 
advantages to those who invest in bringing technology to the market.34  An 
example of an RCS regime is the one instituted under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act whereby the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) affords a variety of 
periods of exclusivity to drug developers who disclose clinical trial data 
about new chemical entities, new uses for old drugs (including in pediatric 
populations), and bioequivalence data.35  A participant suggested that a 
system of RCSs replaces the difficult concepts of novelty and non-
obviousness with experimental results on safety and efficacy,36 which is 
what scientists in the health care industry really desire.  In addition, an RCS 
system would not involve the costs of patent prosecution and the ensuing 
litigation, claim construction, and the difficult concept of non-obviousness, 
which was noted helps promote attorneys’ fees, but not much innovation. 
 However, there was concern that if we used an RCS model instead 
of a patent model, then we would simply be shifting the costs and 
uncertainties of complications from the patent system to the FDA, which 
31 See generally MATT RIDLEY, THE RATIONAL OPTIMIST (Harper Collins Publishers 2010).  
32 MATT RIDLEY, THE RATIONAL OPTIMIST (Harper Collins Publishers 2010).  
33 See e.g. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6 (2003) (“One panelist asserted 
that the time and money his software company spends on creating and filing these so-called 
defensive patents, which ‘have no . . . innovative value in and of themselves,’ could have 
been better spent on developing new technologies.”). 
34 Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters – An Emerging Class of Administrative 
Properties (forthcoming 2013).  
35 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E), 355a (2012). 
36 This can be thought of as a more meaningful form of the utility requirement of 
patentability. 
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has its own institutional delays and inefficiencies.  Perhaps the FDA’s 
delays and inefficiencies are less pronounced than those in the PTO and in 
the patent litigation context, but it was agreed that an RCS model is not a 
panacea. 
 One comment made about RCSs was that the data submitted to the 
FDA is typically held in confidence.  This concerned some participants.  If 
exclusivity is given, then why the need for all of the secrecy?37  Some 
participants argued that consumers should know more about clinical trial 
results so they can make more informed choices about whether they are 
willing to pay more for a new drug than an old one. 
Other participants further noted that just because it may be desirable 
to have different solutions for different areas of technology, this does not 
mean that immediately regulating every emerging technology or industry is 
advisable.  In fact, someone suggested that the patent system is probably a 
good default system until a certain industry or technology gets its own 
regulatory system.  But once regulation of a certain area starts, then RCSs 
are a good method of incentivizing innovation.  Of course, RCSs are not 
perfect, but they do take scientists and consumers down to real world utility 
that is important.  In addition to the concerns expressed above, some 
problems with RCSs are: (1) they are subject to abuse; (2) rarely is there an 
effective advocate for the public as a whole; and (3) an agency serves as a 
gatekeeper and sometimes agencies get captured.  Of course, patents may 
suffer from the same problems.  Despite these potential problems, RCSs 
may solve some industries’ problems and it may be advisable to require 
innovators to opt for either patent rights or an RCS.38 
 
2.  Collectively Governed Systems 
 Another alternative to the patent system that was discussed in depth 
was collectively governed systems for innovation that do not rely on 
exclusive legal rights.  Professional norms and open source software are 
examples.  Such systems might not be true alternatives to patents, but 
instead are systems that can coexist with patents.  That is, the patent system 
and specific doctrines often have a big impact on the viability of those other 
37 See Rebecca Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity, in THE LAW 
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 467-91 
(R. C. Dreyfuss and K.J. Strandburg, eds) (Edward Elgar Pub. 2011). 
38 See Yaniv Heled, Why Primary Patents Covering Biologics Should be Unenforceable 
Against Generic Applicants Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, 21 
ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 211 (2012). 
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systems, which affects not only the amount of innovation, but also which 
innovation we get.39 
 These other institutions and how they interact with the patent system 
can partly determine at what point in the innovation process we should have 
patent rights.  For example, with respect to pharmaceuticals, patent doctrine 
has pushed exclusivity up the chain of generality so utility has ceased to be 
a requirement and more like an exception for pharmaceuticals.  That is, to 
get a patent on a new drug, one does not need to show that it works at all; 
all that needs to be shown is that it might work.40  Of course, although 
patent law does not require efficacy, pre-marketing regulation does require 
proof of efficacy and safety.41 
One explanation for the lack of new drugs in the pharmaceutical 
industry is that the amount of exclusivity given is insufficient.  As a result, 
there is a lot of talk about the pharmaceutical companies being interested in 
engaging in open innovation and public-private partnerships.  It is unclear if 
this is a real attempt to change the institutional structure for innovation or if 
it is just another road to move invention and development towards subsidies 
rather than exclusivities.42  Nonetheless, it exemplifies the interplay 
between these institutions.43 
39 See e.g. Katherine J. Strandburg, Legal But Acceptable: Pallin v. Singer and Physician 
Patenting Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS 
OF IP (R. Dreyfuss and J. Ginsburg, eds., 2013) (describing § 287(c) of the Patent Act and 
how this provision interacts well with physicians’ norms). 
40 See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
41 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012); Katharine Van Tassel, Regulating in Uncertainty: Animating 
the Product Public Health Safety Net to Capture Consumer Products that Use Innovative 
Technologies such as Nanotechnology, Genetically Modified Food and Cloned Meat, 2013 
U. OF CHI. LEGAL F. ___ (forthcoming 2013) (describing the burden of proof that 
manufacturers bear to establish both safety and effectiveness for drugs through the 
premarket approval process under the Food, Drug, &Cosmetic Act); see also Jay Dratler, 
Jr., IP and Health Care: Two Economic Themes, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. ____ (2013) 
(“Not only do drug innovators have to create something new, safe, and effective[, t]hey 
also have to prove it’s safe and effective in large-scale clinical trials that are among the 
most complex, tricky and expensive things that any industry does.”). 
42 Another explanation for the lack of new drug development is that too many early-stage 
patents are hindering or actually blocking follow-on innovation.  Jay Dratler, Jr., 
Combinatorial Mathematics and the Problem of Early-Stage Patenting in Biotechnology 4-
5 (Jan. 27, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=959462.  
Because of these patent “thickets,” pharmaceutical companies may be searching for 
alternatives. 
43 Another example of this is taking place at the University of Akron, where the Timken 
Company has partnered with the university and is engaging in open innovation with its core 
technology to help foster further innovation in other industries where this technology may 
be useful (e.g. biomedical products and devices) and to further develop the technology so it 
can be useful to Timken.  See http://www.uakron.edu/im/online-
newsroom/news_details.dot?newsId=31b16504-04a9-48d0-92fb-
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 Reputational credit and other non-pecuniary interests may also 
incentivize innovation.  Several participants thought that these could play an 
enormous and important role as there are situations where economically 
motivated people use collaborative innovation.44  Early in the development 
of some industries, there are periods where everyone shares everything.45  
To fully take advantage of these alternative motivating forces we must 
engage in more research to understand when and why this happens and 
what the pros and cons are when compared to the market-based patent 
system. 
 Another suggested modification to the patent system was doing 
more with exemptions to infringement.  The basic idea is to have a fair use 
doctrine in patent law, unlike that in copyright law.46  Such a doctrine 
accounts for these alternative innovation systems and considers their vitality 
in light of the existence of patents.47  For example, if we have an alternative 
system for promoting innovation in research, such as reputational interests, 
and this system does not use patents, then the exemption should consider 
the fact that the alternative system may be vulnerable to attacks from the 
outside (via patent infringement) because it does not have blocking patents 
to assert as leverage.  Although not dispositive, this factor would weigh in 
favor of an exemption.48   
More concretely, if we think medical doctors are basically the only 
people doing important innovative work in medical procedures and they 
have a system in place that rewards innovation in medical procedure 
without the use of patents, then we may want to sacrifice the occasional 
electrical engineer who comes up with a great medical procedure because 
allowing an outsider to have patent rights and enforce them against the 
medical doctors would threaten the whole alternative system.49  This is the 
d489a94dfbbf&pageTitle=Top%20Story%20Headline&crumbTitle=New%20University%
20lab%20promotes%20idea-sharing%20and%20innovation.  
44 See e.g. Strandburg, supra note 39, at III.A. (describing ophthalmologists rejecting 
patents on surgical techniques because they have always documented originality by 
publication and place information sharing and patient care as a higher priority.). 
45 Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 passim  (1983); see 
also Peter B. Meyer, Episodes of Collective Invention, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466880 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Working Paper No. 368, 2003). 
46 See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 266 
(2011). 
47 Id. at 299.  This exemption is broader than the already existing, but limited, experimental 
use exemption.  See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? 
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 81 (2004). 
48 Strandburg, supra note 46, at 300-01. 
49 See generally Strandburg, supra note 39, at 18. 
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rationale behind section 287(c) of the Patent Act.50  Section 287(c) 
extinguishes the remedy against infringing physicians performing a 
patented medical procedure and effectively deals with the inventor from 
outside the physician system as well as those inside the system who want to 
defect and take their innovation to the market-based patent system.  Such an 
exemption protects the alternative system.51 
 As an institutional matter, we should really ask if we think the best 
innovation will occur within one or more of these alternative systems.  If so, 
we should be willing to sacrifice a particular inventor so as to preserve the 
alternative systems.  Such a view of fair use could be used to protect the 
alternative systems and could be narrowly tailored.52 
In sum, we must continue to consider what the patent system should 
encourage and whether the Patent Act’s current structure achieves those 
ends.  Despite these fundamental inquiries, policymakers and health care 
stakeholders should closely consider the suggested alternatives to patent law 
as they may spur innovation without the same deadweight loss generated by 
patents. 
 
III.  PROPRIETARY HEALTH INFORMATION 
During the next portion of the Forum, the participants shifted their 
focus from patent law and alternatives to incentivizing health-related 
innovation to data about health care and the innovations.  This discussion 
was comprised of two parts.  The first part dealt with data related to pricing, 
costs, and value of health care.  The second part dealt with personal data 
and privacy. 
 
A.  Pricing, Costs, and Value 
 As illustrated by the interest in the use of RCSs, which provide 
shelters from competition for disclosing, inter alia, clinical trial data,53 
there is an emphasis on IP protection not just for how products are made, 
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012). 
51 Section 287(c) does not apply to drugs and medical products.  35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) 
(“’medical activity’ means the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, 
but shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of 
matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a 
biotechnology patent.”). 
52 Of course, such a proposal raises other questions, including whether such a system would 
increase uncertainty and litigation costs and how the norms of the physicians would be 
established in the courtroom. 
53 See supra Part II.C.1.  
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but also for information about products.  What is needed is a way to 
incentivize the creation of information about products and to incentivize 
using the information in the health care system via comparative 
effectiveness research about the products.  Doing so will better equip 
consumers and the government to understand how we pay for drugs.  For 
example, if a drug gives marginally better treatments for a disease, then 
perhaps we should only pay marginally more for it.  In essence, the system 
should incentivize not just information creation, but also disclosure of the 
information, including information about prices and effectiveness.  
Disclosure of this type of information is distinct from disclosures about 
safety and efficacy that already take place for regulatory approval. 
An underlying problem with respect to the use of data is the fact that 
the free market economy does not work terribly well with respect to 
medical care.  The prices negotiated between the insurance companies and 
providers are secret to everyone outside of the negotiation, such as other 
providers, patients, and insurance companies.  This, in effect, creates a 
black box.54  Participants suggested that if more price information was 
disclosed, then this may lead to more competition between health care 
providers on quality rather than negotiating the best set of prices.  This is 
because patients could easily compare the price and take them into account, 
along with other information such as quality outcomes, when deciding on a 
course of care.  In short, the hope is for less innovation on complex 
multivariate pricing formulas, which is a symptom of financialization in 
certain areas, and a move towards good indicators of quality and what is 
actually effective. 
For example, in a study of pricing data for chest x-rays at California 
hospitals, some hospitals charged patients close to $200 while another 
charged approximately $1,500.55  Likewise, in Boston, a study showed that 
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) charged $51,000 for coronary 
bypass procedures whereas the Boston Medical Center charged $34,000 for 
the same procedure.56  It may be that the services provided by MGH are 
better, that it obtains better results, or has the harder cases referred to it.  
But if consumers have access to the data, then they can analyze it to see if 
the different pricing is based on quality differentials or differential power.  
It was noted however that there are some things that are easy to compare 
between providers, such as taking an x-ray.  Pretty much everyone does this 
54 Frank Pasquale, Cultivating, Complementing, & Curbing IP Protections for Health Care 
Data, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. ___ (2013).  
55 Lucette Lagnado, California Hospitals Open Books, Showing Huge Price Differences, at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB110410465492809649.html (last visited March 15, 2013).  
56 Aaron Atencio, Comparable Quality, Different Prices, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2008, 
at http://www.boston.com/news/health/articles/2008/11/16/differentprices.  
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the same way, so it is easy to compare.  But diagnosis is completely 
different.  The unique circumstances of each patient complicate this 
comparison between providers.  As a result, disclosure of pricing data may 
effectively create competition on quality of care in some circumstances, but 
may be less helpful in others. 
Assuming disclosure of pricing data results in a net gain, an 
important question is how we use certain levers in health law to reveal how 
certain things are priced.  Small steps have been made toward getting inside 
the black box.57  Some participants hope that implementing health care 
reform will provide easier access to this data because there will be more of 
an emphasis on revealing it.58 
 The black box nature of health care data distinguishes its pricing 
from other markets – no one goes in knowing the price.  Patients’ inability 
to negotiate further distinguishes health care.  If you go to the hospital with 
a kidney stone, you are not going to negotiate a price – you are paying 
whatever it costs to fix the problem.  As stated by one participant, “health 
economics is the poster child for market failure.”  We cannot have a pure 
free market system for health care in the U.S. because there are so many 
built-in exceptions to the neoclassical free market, such as information 
asymmetry, lack of choice, and lack of transparency.59  Third-party 
payment further complicates this situation as the person paying (the insurer) 
is not the person receiving the benefit (the patient).  Given this difference in 
market structure, why do we allow a black box system to exist?  Protection 
of this type of data makes it so there is no rational relationship between the 
price that is billed and the service provided.60   
 With this skepticism about health care markets, what should be done 
about them?  Rhetorically, one participant questioned if we were proposing 
a public utilities commission model for health care.  Participants suggested 
several possible solutions or improvements to the market problem.  First, it 
was noted that some areas had a system where all insurers paid the same 
57 See generally Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a 
Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57 (2006). 
58 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2718, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010); see also Wall Street Journal, How to Research health Care Prices, at 
http://guides.wsj.com/health/health-costs/how-to-research-health-care-prices (last visited 
March 15, 2013). 
59 This is not necessarily the case for all medical procedures though.  Elective procedures 
appear to be the exception.  Lasik surgery is a great example.  The cost of Lasik was pretty 
high, but now it is fairly cheap because consumers have the ability to shop around and get 
the best combination of quality and price. 
60 Compare with the market-based system underlying patent law discussed supra at Part II. 
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price to the same hospital (a most favored nation type system).61  If the 
provider charged $850 to insurer A for a particular procedure, then it must 
charge $850 to all insurers for the same procedure.  A different provider 
could charge a different price though.  These most favored nation clauses 
could help the market distortion problem at least between insurers and 
providers. 
A second suggestion was administered pricing, which is a system 
with a formula that takes into consideration multiple factors, such as the 
skill of the doctor, how much effort was required, how much concentration 
was needed, how much time the procedure took, etcetera.  Despite the 
attraction of administered pricing, the problem with it is that it is very slow 
to change.  For example, we may have a procedure at time zero and it is 
very laborious.  But later we have a change in technology that makes the 
procedure much easier to perform.  Until the inputs to the formula are 
updated, the providers are still paid at the higher rate.  It oftentimes takes a 
long period of time for the change in price to take effect. 
A third suggestion was using the data available from other countries 
as a guide for U.S. pricing for health care.  These countries permit use of 
the same procedures and equipment as the U.S. and they make their data 
available.62  These countries allow one price to be charged for procedure X 
and the price is public.  Of course, it may not be the “right” price for the 
U.S., but it could be used as a good baseline to compare the American 
prices to and to ask why providers here are charging so much more.63  
 A fourth suggestion for an alternative to the current market structure 
is Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs).  “An ACO generally is defined 
as a local organization comprised of and controlled by primary care 
physicians, specialists, and other providers that are jointly accountable for 
the cost and quality of the full continuum of care delivered to a patient 
61 James C. DeChane, Preferred Provider Organization Structures and Agreements, 4 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 35, 59-62 (1995); Anthony J. Dennis, Most Favored Nation Contract 
Clauses Under the Antitrust Laws, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 821, 822-24 (1995); Arnold 
Celnicker, A Competitive Analysis of Most Favored Nations Clauses in Contracts Between 
Health Care Providers and Insurers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 863, 868-69 (1991). 
62 See e.g. Alberta Health Care Insurance Plan, available at 
http://www.health.alberta.ca/documents/SOMB-Medical-Prices-2012-04.pdf; Ontario 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Schedule of Benefits for Physician Services 
Under the Health Insurance Act, available at 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/program/ohip/sob/physserv/physserv_mn.ht
ml.   
63 One commentator points out that many variables affect pricing across national 
boundaries, such as customs, exchange rates, and standards of living, and queries whether 
it would be better to study the effect of secrecy and regulation on pricing. 
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population.”64  Right now, chronic illness accounts for a large amount of the 
costs of health care.  By some estimates, 20% of patients make up 80% of 
the costs.65  ACOs are tasked with reducing what they spend while 
maintaining quality over a given population.  If they are successful, then the 
ACOs will receive additional money.66 
 Despite focusing on solutions that using data could provide, it was 
pointed out that data will not answer all of the questions.  There are still 
value judgments to be made behind the data.  For example, we may have a 
more effective pill that can be taken once per week instead of daily.  
Because of this, the pill generates an increased rate of compliance, but the 
weekly pill costs more than the daily pill.  How do we value the patient’s 
convenience?  Do we take the attitude that if people cannot be bothered to 
take their medicine once a day, then we should not be willing to pay an 
extra $100 for their convenience?  No consensus was reached on how to 
make these value judgments, but everyone agreed that they can and should 
play an important role. 
 Most participants agreed that the health care market is in failure and 
is replete with problems caused, in part, by a lack of access to pricing and 
quality data.  The suggestions discussed at the Forum aimed to reduce the 
opacity of health care and to explore the few advances that have been made.  
Nonetheless, a tremendous amount of reform is still required. 
 
B.  Personal Data and Privacy 
 Not all health care data is the same.67  The discussion up to this 
point focused on pricing and value data.  But personal and genetic data 
could be very helpful in providing better health care.  However, laws such 
as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPPA)68 and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
(GINA)69 may protect this type of data from disclosure and complicate 
64 Jessica L. Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat it 
Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393, 1410 (2012). 
65 Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentration of U.S. Health Care Expenditures, 19 
RESEARCH IN ACTION 3 (June 2006), available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/ria19/expendria.pdf.  
66 Mantel, supra note 64, at 1410-11. 
67 See Timothy S. Hall, The Quantified Self Movement: Legal Challenges and Benefits of 
Personal Biometric Data Tracking, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. ___ (2013) (describing 
purchasing data predicting influenza outbreaks and biometric data from pedometers and 
nutritional tracking apps being used to improve health outcomes of individuals). 
68 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936  (1996). 
69 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(2008).  
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efforts to obtain it.  For example, one research organization reported 
HIPAA: (1) reduced patient recruitment; (2) increased selection bias; (3) 
increased the costs of research by requiring additional paperwork and 
complicating IRB processes; (4) increased errors when de-identified 
information was used; and (5) caused project abandonment.70  The 
difficulties created by privacy laws raised the following questions: whether 
protection for personal health data is important and whether these privacy 
laws create obstacles to the medical profession using digital technology to 
share such data. 
 Some participants argued that some patients are not really concerned 
about their personal health data because they do not suffer from any illness 
or condition that would cause them to be embarrassed, ridiculed, or 
discriminated against.  The argument continued that because many (or 
perhaps most) patients are not concerned about their personal health data, 
the laws protecting such data create needless inefficiencies and make using 
the personal health data more difficult. 
 Several participants took issue with this argument.  One participant 
argued that what prevented the medical profession from using technology 
that would support the interchange of data is the lack of standards and the 
interchangeability of file formats.71  Another participant noted that the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provides incentives to 
make meaningful use of health records, so steps are being made to solve 
this problem.72   
 Another response to the needless inefficiency argument was that we 
should not think about privacy in a choice paradigm (that privacy is wholly 
about whether I think my information is private).  The problem with this 
model is that for any particular topic, an overwhelming majority of people 
do not care about protecting their information.73  Therefore, if a vote on any 
one particular issue were held, the result would always be to share the 
information.   
So privacy is really a minority protective device and a social 
concept.  It is not good enough to say that we can let people decide and if 
someone really has a special reason to keep their information private, then 
70 Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of Individual Choice, 
98 CAL. L. REV. 1765, 1795-96 (2010) (quoting Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality, 
National Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics (Nov. 19, 2003)). 
71 See Pasquale, supra note 54, at ____ (“But to integrate and to port data, all systems need 
to be able to translate symptoms, diagnoses, interventions, and outcomes into commonly 
recognized coding.”)  
72 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §13101, 123 Stat. 
115 (2009), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-12. 
73 PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 233 (Univ. North Carolina Press 1995).  
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they can go ahead and ask for it to be kept private.  The problem with this is 
that if one asks for their information to be kept private, then those seeking 
the information know the person has the condition, disease, etcetera.  Others 
echoed this belief and stated that an opt-out system is not necessarily the 
best path for health data. 
In short, privacy is more complicated than the choice paradigm 
makes it seem and this makes the conceptual framework for privacy very 
important.  Despite its importance, the large problem that exists in 
discussions about health privacy is that there is no clear conceptual 
framework for what we are worried about.  Without a clear vision of what 
we are concerned about, it makes it very difficult to create a system tailored 
to research and privacy. 
 
IV.  CONFLICTS WITH NON-IP VALUES 
 The final topic of discussion at the IP Forum revolved around IP 
values conflicting with other non-IP values.  The conversation began by 
recognizing that patents are frequently justified on efficient innovation-
incentivizing grounds, but other interests, such as human rights, morality, 
ethics, and ordre public may play an important role too.74  If these conflicts 
exist, how can they be resolved?  The predominate focus of the discussion 
revolved around health care and the lack of pharmaceuticals in developing 
countries. 
 One participant suggested that it is impossible to put off talking 
about these competing values.  These values are part and parcel of every 
aspect of our patent system.  Because we have values other than efficiently 
incentivizing innovation, we should not think of these various values as 
destroying and undermining the IP system.  Instead, we should think of the 
IP system as a flexible one which can allow accommodation when there is a 
conflict.  To this end, international activists are working through the 
74 See e.g. Kara W. Swanson, Patents, Politics, and Abortion, forthcoming in WILLIAM T. 
GALLAGHER AND DEBORA J. HALBERT, EDS., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CONTEXT: 
LAW AND SOCIETY PERSPECTIVES ON IP 1, 6 (forthcoming Cambridge University Press, 
2013) (draft on file with Reporter) (describing the U.S. patent office as choosing the less-
controversial option to defend a rule against patenting life given the politics focused on life 
in the 1970s); see also Jeffrey M. Samuels, Up In Smoke Down Under 1 (2012) (on file 
with Reporter) (describing the conflict between trademark rights and public health vis à vis 
the Australian High Court’s decision regarding The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act) and Jim 
Chen, Bioprospect Theory, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. ____ (2013) (recommending the use 
of bioprospect theory as a means for humanity to “eschew the remote prospect of wealth . . 
. and focus on how it might better manage anthropogenic ecological disasters before they 
become full-blown, irreversible cataclysms of global proportions.”). 
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political process to push for recognition of these values and to create more 
flexibility within TRIPS.75 
International patent law, it was argued, needs modification to allow 
these other values to flourish.  TRIPS has “hardened” the patent system by 
creating a floor of strong intellectual property rights so that it has become 
more difficult to craft national laws that incorporate other values.  As such, 
although pharmaceutical companies have the choices to be green, be 
humane, or prioritize other values at the expensive of their bottom lines, 
TRIPS does little to promote these choices.  Importantly, under an exclusive 
rights regime, the pharmaceutical companies’ choices are all but final.  The 
grassroots pushback for a humanitarian or human-rights-based model is to 
focus on implementation of statutory schemes in developing countries that 
maximize TRIPS-compliant flexibilities rather than “hardening” patent law 
further with TRIPS-plus IP protections and enforcement measures.  
Preserving and promoting TRIPS’s flexibility would allow implementation 
to be done differently in one country if it chose to do so. 
In response, an argument was made that if patents encourage drug 
development, then the current generation disregarding patent rights for an 
immediate benefit may result in no new drugs for subsequent generations.  
This effect flows from future potential innovators being unwilling to take 
the risk of ignored and unenforced patents.  In reply to this concern, some 
participants argued that pharmaceutical companies could continue to price 
discriminate, but should not be allowed to cut off access to massive parts of 
the world and keep data secret.  Price discrimination, although not 
economically beneficial for consumers in higher-paying countries, does 
open up access to medicine for citizens of poorer countries.76 
 Some participants focused on the economics behind the drug 
industry and pointed out that the real goal should be to have the drug sold at 
a rate that is not so high for these less developed countries that their citizens 
cannot afford the care they need.  The problem, from the drug companies’ 
perspectives, is arbitrage.  To help solve the arbitrage problem, one 
participant suggested creating audit trails on supply chains.  That is, we 
already have systems that watch us as individuals, so why not have a similar 
system for drugs which says that drugs with codes saying “Made for 
Botswana” are illegal in the United States?  By engaging in this type of 
75 See e.g. Doctors without Borders; Access to Medicines Campaign; Oxfam; Health 
Global Access Projects; Knowledge Ecology International; Public Citizens Global Access 
to Medicines Program; Treatment Action Campaign (South Africa); and Lawyers' 
Collective (India).   
76 Jay Dratler, Jr., IP and Health Care: Two Economic Themes, 7 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 
____ (2013) (describing how pricing drugs below costs in less developed countries “could 
save millions of lives around the world and still give the [pharmaceutical company’s] 
investors a satisfactory rate of return.”). 
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price discrimination, the pharmaceutical companies can charge market-
appropriate amounts for their products, while still providing the drugs to 
those in less developed countries.  This system would help pharmaceutical 
companies contain arbitrage.  We do this with importation restrictions in 
developed countries.77  Similarly, pharmaceutical companies might also use 
technological means of avoiding international arbitrage, as was done with 
DVD country codes,78 by a method of required color-coding or the like. 
A different model of resolving the conflicts between IP and other 
values was illustrated by the example of the Medicines Patent Pool.79  This 
group uses transparency in the negotiation process to put together a patent 
pool for producing HIV/AIDS drugs in less developed countries.  It 
negotiates licenses with pharmaceutical companies and puts on its web site 
the licenses it has executed and the status of the negotiations it is having 
with different pharmaceutical companies.80  Although it is too early to know 
how effective it will be, this organization appears to be putting pressure on 
pharmaceutical companies that care about their reputation to expand their 
markets for life-saving medicines to countries that need it most.  
The conflicts between values certainly create a tough problem.  
Resolving these conflicts requires an appreciation of both short-term and 
long-term consequences, an understanding of different cultures and 
economies, and compassion.  It also requires an understanding of 
economics, so as to avoid killing the goose of research that lays the golden 
egg of new drugs.  There are no easy answers, but interesting work is 
beginning to achieve a result that strikes an appropriate balance between 
competing values. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 As illustrated above, participants at the Sixth Annual Forum raised 
and exhaustively discussed a number of current issues.  The intersection of 
IP and public health raises issues dealing with economic theories, human 
and corporate motivation, the process of innovation, privacy, and human 
rights.  Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the participants did not resolve 
the conflicts between these thorny issues.  Nonetheless, the discussion that 
took place contributed greatly towards exploring the problems and 
77 See e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 331(t) (2012). 
78 Robert C. Denicola, Fair’s Fair: An Argument for Mandatory Disclosure of 
Technological Protection Measures, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004) 
(“DVDs have included copy protection since their inception; they also contain embedded 
regional codes designed to limit play to DVD players coded for a particular geographic 
region.”). 
79 See generally http://www.medicinespatentpool.org.  
80 See http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/licensing/company-engagement.  
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consequences from and the solutions and alternatives to these issues.  It is 
the hope of all the IP Scholars Forum participants that this White Paper will 
help steer future discussions about IP and public health and serve as a 
starting point for future analysis and just resolution of these problems. 
